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Slower growth, or even a decline, of the labour force and an increase in old-age de-
pendency will slow down the growth of aggregrate output and output per capita in 
many developed countries. However, a major question is whether there is any sys-
tematic link between demographics and the productivity of those who will still be 
active during the up-coming period of demographic ageing. As productivity is diffi-
cult to investigate at a micro level, the paper builds on a large macro-data panel cov-
ering developed as well as developing countries and explores the impact of the age 
composition of the labour force on levels and growth rates of output per worker as 
well as on total factor productivity (TFP). The results point to an inversely U-shaped 
relationship between the share of workers in different age groups and productivity 
which works mainly through the TFP channel and is effectively much stronger than 
what can be observed at a micro level. In-depths analyses suggest that cohort effects 
in human-capital accumulation may contribute to this pattern, but do not explain it. 
The paper concludes with simulations for a number of OECD countries showing that 
the impact of projected ageing of the labour force on productivity and per-capita 
growth could be really substantial in some cases. 
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th century, there has been a secular decline in fertility rates in virtually all 
industrialized countries, with the number of births mostly falling below a “replacement 
level” during the last three decades. A parallel, strong increase in longevity adds to the 
picture of demographic ageing as a current mega-trend. However, continuing reductions 
in age-specific mortality rates now mainly relate to years of age in which individuals are 
clearly beyond their active life span. As a result, most developed countries will be faced 
with a considerable slow-down in growth, in many cases even a decline, in their labour 
force. With an increasing share of older individuals, changes in total population growth 
tend to exhibit the same patterns, but will be far less pronounced. 
  The economic implications of these changes are of first-order significance, espe-
cially for countries that will be particularly hard hit. Nevertheless, disputes about many 
of the potential consequences are still unsettled. For example, surprisingly little is actu-
ally known regarding the impact of large shifts in the age composition of the labour 
force on productivity growth, which is what the present paper is going to look at. A ma-
jor reason is that demographic ageing as it is currently observed in the developed world 
is largely unprecedented. Hard empirical evidence is thus necessarily lacking. From a 
theoretical point of view, there are a number of diverging effects for productivity 
growth: exogenous, age-related differences in productivity at an individual level could 
matter here; other effects could work via the capital–labour ratio or, more fundamen-
tally, via savings and capital accumulation; also, the demographic structure of the labour 
force could have effects for average productivity that cannot be traced back to individ-
ual workers or their proportion to other factors of production. Some of these effects are 
rather obvious in their direction, while others are ambiguous or simply unclear. The 
joint impact on productivity growth and economic performance, including the timing by 
which it will become effective in the countries affected, is ultimately an empirical ques-
tion – so that serious research in this area would be at a loss. What remains to be done, 
therefore, is bringing forth reasonable theoretical conjectures and using data and meth-
ods that are in place to assess their relevance in order to push forward the boundaries of 
our knowledge. This is essentially what the present paper attempts to do. 
  The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will browse through the body of 
relevant literature, discussing the main observations that have been made. In Section 3, I 
take up a simple macroeconomic model of how the age composition of the labour force 
could affect productivity growth. Section 4 reports on procedures and results of an em-  2
pirical assessment of the model, based on a large macro-data panel spanning a longer 
time series and covering developed as well as developing countries. Extending existing 
work, I also look at the potential role of cohort effects in educational attainments. Sec-
tion 5 adds illustrative simulations as to what the econometric estimates could mean for 
future economic performance in a number of developed countries – viz., the US, Japan, 
Germany, the UK, and France – with diverging demographic prospects. Section 6 con-
cludes, commenting on promising paths for future research in this area. 
 
2  Productivity and demographic ageing: ideas and observations 
Note, first of all, that there is a direct, negative impact of demographic change on the 
growth rates of aggregate output and output per capita. To illustrate this, let us assume 
for an instant that the growth rate of output per worker – i.e., productivity growth – 
were exogenously given, hence entirely unaffected by demographic change. If the num-
ber of individuals who engage in production grows at a smaller rate than in the past, or 
even diminishes, the growth rate of aggregate output will slow down correspondingly. 
Of course, one need not really worry about this reduction in economic growth along its 
“extensive” margin; people may simply have to get used to smaller growth figures. 
What is more important from an economist’s point of view is that the “intensive” 
growth rate of per-capita output, which is sometimes used as a rough indicator of indi-
vidual well-being, is also likely to decline. The reason is that, whatever the precise 
trends are, the growth rate of total population will nowhere decelerate as much as that of 
the working-age population, while the share of the population that is economically inac-
tive, hence the economic dependency ratio, will go up substantially. 
  Both these effects figure prominently in a number of recent simulation exercises 
regarding the economic consequences of demographic ageing.
1 They are straightforward 
from the simple arithmetic of economic growth, so that there is little room to evade 
them. At the same time, the above considerations imply that the key question arising in 
this context is really whether there is any systematic impact of demographic change on 
productivity growth. After all, it is far from clear that, in spite of all the expected shifts 
in demographic fundamentals and the economic environment, average productivity of 
those who remain active during the period of overt demographic ageing will be entirely 
unaffected. Therefore, the present paper mainly focuses on the effects of expected shifts 
in the age composition of the labour force which are largely driven by the pronounced 
fertility decline since the mid-1970s on the growth of output per worker. 
                                            
1   See, for example, Martins et al. (2005) or European Commission (2005). There, the focus is on ways 
to increase labour-force participation to counter the wide-spread downward trend in the working-age 
population. In case this can be accomplished, there will be a positive effect for aggregate and per-
capita growth, but the results are still mainly governed by the simple rule of proportion applied above.   3
2.1 “Capital deepening” in standard growth theory 
Neglecting the age composition of the labour force and concentrating on its size, a con-
ventional neoclassical growth model in which output per worker, q = Y /L = T f (k), is 
co-determined by the capital–labour ratio, k = K /L, predicts an increase in labour pro-
ductivity if the growth rate of L diminishes. (In standard notation, T measures the cur-
rent state of technological progress, while the functional form of f (⋅) represents the ge-
neric type of technology that is currently available and may not change so much over 
time.) In the basic framework suggested by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), the saving 
rate is taken to be exogenous, so that capital accumulation is given by  δ − = K sY K / ˆ , 
where s is the saving rate and δ the depreciation rate.
2 Since the time path of K is gov-
erned by s, Y and δ, changes in L ˆ  trigger endogenous adjustments in the model that 
feed back on k via Y. 
  To see this, assume that L initially grows at a constant rate L ˆ , that there is no tech-
nological progress ( 0 ˆ = T ), and that the economy is on a balanced, “steady-state” 
growth path on which Y and K grow at the same rate as L, while k and, hence, q remain 
constant (because  L K k ˆ ˆ ˆ − = ).
3 If, then, L starts persistently growing more slowly than 
it did before, the immediate response in K is limited to a less than proportional decline 
in  K ˆ  which becomes stronger and stronger until a new steady state is reached. During 
the entire transition period (with  0 ˆ > k ) and also in the new steady state, there is thus 
more capital per worker, and q as a measure of labour productivity increases. This 
“capital-deepening” effect can be made explicit by calculating the growth rate of output 
per worker,  ) ˆ ˆ )( / ( ˆ L K f k f q − ′ = . The right-hand side of this equation represents capital 
deepening – “capital dilution” in the case of a reverse change in L ˆ  – which has a posi-
tive impact on q ˆ  if L ˆ  declines and vanishes if K ˆ  has adjusted to L ˆ . 
  The same effect feeds through to changes in output per capita, y = Y /N = (L /N) q.
4 
With respect to  N L f k f f K f k f N L L K f k f y ˆ ˆ / ) ( ˆ ) / ( ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ˆ )( / ( ˆ ) ( − ′ − + ′ = − + − ′ = , there 
is an additional “dependency” effect of  N L ˆ ˆ −  which is negative if  0 ˆ ˆ < ∆ − ∆ N L , that is, 
if  L ˆ  is shrinking faster than N ˆ  due to an increasing share of individuals who are out of 
the labour force. This dependency effect – or, ultimately, a negative “participation” ef-
fect of the decline in L ˆ  – always dominates the capital-deepening effect.
5 All in all, 
                                            
2   A hat over a symbol conventionally indicates the growth rate of the respective variable 
3   With technological progress, things become a bit more complicated. As long as growth in T does not 
meet further conditions, a steady-state growth path need not exist (see Section 3 below). 
4   In standard growth models there is often no distinction between the number of workers L and total 
population N as everyone is assumed to be active in the labour market. Here, I am a bit more careful. 
5   Combining the two effects of changes in L ˆ  as I do above, one can see that their sum is equal to the 
share of wages in output, w/f > 0, in a competitive environment. Therefore, sign (∆ L ˆ ) directly matters 
for what happens to y as a total effect of changes in the labour force. Keep in mind that  K ˆ  moves in 
the same direction as  L ˆ  during the transition to a new steady state.   4
capital deepening may therefore moderate the direct, quantitative impact of slower 
growth in the labour force on per-capita growth, but it will not reverse it. Furthermore, 
capital deepening can be weakened, but also reinforced, if the saving rate s is not ex-
ogenous as it is in the neoclassical standard model.
6 
 
2.2 The empirical evidence thus far 
Most of the empirical work on economic growth done prior to the 1990s is now clearly 
out-dated, due to improvements in both econometric methodology and data availability 
that have been achieved since then. Brandner and Dowrick (1994) are thus the first to 
investigate the impact of demographics on economic performance, specifically on per-
capita output and per-capita growth, in an up-to-date fashion for a large panel of devel-
oped and developing countries. Building on the Solow–Swan model and using popula-
tion growth as the relevant regressor, they find that, to the extent that they can isolate it, 
the capital-deepening effect is weak and insignificant. Effectively lumping together the 
participation and dependency effects, they find a much stronger impact of the working-
age share of population which is both positive and significant. The role of investment 
for output and growth is also positive and significant, as one should expect. Yet, as in 
many other applied studies on growth, the most important source of variation in output 
and growth, both across countries and over time, appears to be a productivity indicator 
taken to reflect the current stage of technological progress in each country. 
  In a more recent paper, Ahituv (2001) uses an augmented model which includes 
variables reflecting average qualifications of workers, i.e., human capital accumulation. 
He concentrates on capital deepening and dependency effects as the two main channels 
for how demographics could affect output per capita in an even larger panel of coun-
tries. Using fertility rates instead of total population growth as a regressor, he finds the 
former effect to be significant. Still, his estimates suggest that the latter channel is more 
important in explaining a negative effect of high fertility on output per capita. Like 
Brandner and Dowrick (1994), Ahituv (2001) looks at contemporaneous relationships 
only – i.e., effects of current fertility rates on current economic performance
7 – thus 
neglecting long-term consequences of changes in fertility for economic growth that are 
currently moving to the fore and should therefore rank high on the research agenda. 
                                            
6   In a Ramsey-type growth model with endogenous saving (Ramsey 1928), the impact of a decline in L ˆ  
on st is truly ambiguous. Heuristically, there are two opposing effects: individuals may save less as an 
increasing k puts the rate of return under pressure; they may as well save more to keep up consumption 
at old age. Ultimately, this is a matter of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between consump-
tion at different ages, hence an empirical question. See Appendix A.1 for a formal treatment. 
7   Therefore, he also tests for reverse causality, concluding that the negative relation between fertility 
and output per capita is effectively the result of bi-directional dependence.   5
  An important step in this direction is taken by Lindh and Malmberg (1999) who are 
the first to investigate the idea that, in developed countries, there may be an impact of 
the age composition of the population, which is mainly shaped by past birth rates, on the 
growth rate of output per worker. Their results indicate that, controlling for net invest-
ment and labour-force growth within an overall model of transitional growth with grad-
ual adjustments of technology, there is a significant positive effect of the share of those 
who are currently aged 50–64 years. The share of elderly people (aged 65 and over) has 
a significant negative effect on productivity growth, while younger age groups have 
ambiguous and largely insignificant effects. Perhaps, one of the main shortcomings of 
their study is that the demographic variables used by Lindh and Malmberg (1999) relate 
to total population, not to the working-age population or the labour force, and therefore 
do not allow for stronger conclusions regarding the precise mechanisms at work. 
  Another study dealing with effects of the age composition on productivity and pro-
ductivity growth that uses data relating to both population and labour force is provided 
by Feyrer (2007). Building on a human-capital augmented growth model and a conven-
tional growth-accounting approach (Solow 1957), his main interest lies with the impact 
of demographics on the state and dynamics of technological progress. In other words, he 
mainly looks at the component T in the neoclassical production function, also known as 
the “Solow residual” or as “total factor productivity”, which has often been found to be 
very important for explaining actual growth processes, respectively, their variation 
across countries and over time.
8 There is also a number of recent papers, such as Bloom 
et al. (2007), which demonstrate a growing interest in the link between demographics 
and economic growth in general. Yet, the positive relationship they find between growth 
of per-capita output and changes in the overall activity rate (i.e., 1 – total dependency 
ratio) should not be surprising, simply due to the definition of both these variables. 
  In the empirical part of this paper, I will much build on Feyrer’s (2007) work, ex-
tending it mainly in two directions. First, I add ten more years of data taken from a pe-
riod, 1991 to 2000, when growth was certainly more business as usual than in the post-
war period until well into the 1960s. Second, I will also look at the role of cohort effects 
in human-capital accumulation for the link between demographics and productivity. 
 
2.3 Age-related productivity differentials 
Another strand of the literature stresses that a given worker’s productivity could sys-
tematically differ over his or her active period of life for reasons such as differences in 
experience, depreciation of knowledge or age-related trends in physical and mental ca-
                                            
8   For an extensive survey of empirical work that backs this conclusion, see Easterly and Levine (2000).   6
pabilities. Based on the link between productivity and wages, this is often illustrated 
using micro-level estimates of Mincerian wage equations (Mincer 1974) which measure 
life-cycle profiles of individual wage rates, usually differentiated by gender, as a func-
tion of educational attainments, job experience or age (allowing for non-linear effects) 
and a number of socio-economic background characteristics. Typically, these profiles 
exhibit a strong increase until workers are in their 40s and a moderate decline toward 
the end of the working life. Consequently, if the number of older workers increases vis-
à-vis that of prime-aged workers, there could be a reduction in average productivity. 
  There are several objections to interpreting a Mincer-type wage profile as an indica-
tor of age-related differences in productivity. First, in estimates that are based on cross-
section data, seemingly age-related trends may effectively be due to cohort effects aris-
ing from changes in educational behaviour over time. Levels of qualification are explic-
itly controlled for in the estimation, yet this may not fully remove the distortion. Sec-
ond, life-cycle profiles of wages may effectively reflect seniority rules of pay which 
have little, or nothing, to do with age-related patterns of productivity. Most importantly, 
however, using data that are suited to avoid these two problems, Börsch-Supan (2003) 
demonstrates that age-related productivity differentials which show up in individual 
wage earnings are unlikely to have more than negligible effects for the development of 
average productivity.
9 Even under extreme assumptions regarding the size of these dif-
ferentials, he finds that the gradually changing age distribution of the labour force pro-
jected for Germany until 2050 (where these changes are rather strong) may reduce pro-
ductivity growth only by up to 0.15% per year. 
 An  important  caveat with respect to all kinds of micro-level approaches in this area 
is that productivity (and its life-cycle profile) is not, at least not fully, an individual 
characteristic. As the rough tools of macroeconomic growth theory suggest, it is rather 
the outcome of a complex interaction with other workers and other factors of production 
which takes place within a certain economic environment constituted by the available 
technology, public infrastructure, characteristics of a given firm and sector, and many 
other things beside. This definitely needs to be taken into account when assessing the 
impact of changes in the size and the composition of the labour force on aggregate eco-
nomic performance. 
                                            
9   Börsch-Supan (2003) looks at the structure of two different earnings profiles relating to the employees 
of a major service company in the US (taken from Kotlikoff and Wise 1989), a genuinely longitudinal 
profile for salesmen whose pay is mainly performance-related and an artificial profile for salarymen 
who are newly hired at different ages. The restriction to new hires is meant to neutralize the effects of 
seniority remuneration which may be highly relevant for salaried workers. It turns out that both pro-
files exhibit more variation than simple cross-section results and that the profile for salaried workers 
shows an even stronger decline of earnings at higher ages than that for salesmen. This may be partly 
due to a selection effect between those who stay in a job and those who have to find a new employer.   7
3  A macroeconomic model 
The basic idea which will be put to an empirical test here is the one already pursued by 
Feyrer (2007), viz. that productivity and productivity growth may be influenced by the 
age composition of the labour force, respectively by changes in this structure. Further-
more, from the literature on age-related productivity differentials (see Section 2.3), one 
can already infer that such effects, if they exist, may not so much affect productivity 
that can be directly attributed to the labour input of workers and can be rewarded in 
terms of wages. Instead, they may mainly work via total factor productivity (TFP), i.e., 
technological progress and technology dissemination. 
  To formalize this idea, I start from a particular specification of a neoclassical pro-
duction function, augmenting it with a variable h representing human capital per worker 
and assuming technological progress, now measured by a parameter A, to be “labour-
augmenting” and the production function to be of the Cobb–Douglas variety. As I want 
to test the model using annual data for a large number of countries, I add a country in-
dex i and a time index t. 
    α α − = 1 ) ( it it it it it L h A K Y  (1) 
To be sure, none of these are novel features. Equation (1) is essentially taken from Hall 
and Jones (1999). Taking into account human capital is definitely important as there is a 
lot of variation across countries and over time in this variable, a major drawback for 
many older studies being that this has not been measurable in a reliable fashion. The 
assumption that technological progress is labour-augmenting, or “Harrod-neutral”, is 
necessary for the model to have a steady state (see Uzawa 1961). The assumption that 
the production function is Cobb–Douglas reconciles this definition with the alternative 
one of technological progress being “Hicks-neutral” which is needed for growth ac-
counting to be applicable.
10 
  Re-writing (1) in terms of output per worker, q = Y/L, and re-arranging yields 
    it it it it it it it h A h A k q ) 1 /( 1 ) ( α α α α κ − − = = , (2) 
                                            
10  Technological progress is said to be labour-augmenting, or Harrod-neutral (with reference to Harrod 
1942), if it does not affect the output shares of capital and labour for a given capital-output ratio. It is 
called “Hicks-neutral” (after Hicks 1932) if, as in Y = T K
α
 L
1–α, it does not affect the ratio of marginal 
productivities of capital and labour for a given capital-labour ratio. 
  Note that the definitions of Hicks-neutrality and Harrod-neutrality are not mutually exclusive. How-
ever, they can only be met simultaneously with a production function that exhibits a constant unit elas-
ticity of substitution. Furthermore, a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function (where the sum 
of all partial output elasticities is unity and the output shares of all factors of production are simply 
constant) is the only functional form fulfilling this condition. To see the equivalence, simply assume 
that the TFP measure A included in (1) is related to T by the monotonic transformation A = T
1/(1–α).   8
with the capital coefficient κ = K/Y = k/q. Taking natural logarithms leads to a linear 
decomposition by which A can be isolated. The result is 








Calculating first differences, one obtains (exponential) growth rates of A and the other 
variables, based on ln (xt/xt–1) = ln xt – ln xt–1 ≡ ∆ ln xt (and ln 1 = 0), whereby 
    it it it it h q A ln ln
1
ln ln ∆ − ∆
−




Equations (3) and (4) can be seen as prescriptions of how to calculate TFP both in levels 
and growth rates based on data regarding Y, K, L and h, thereby controlling for the role 
of pure factor accumulation for output and productivity growth. Bearing in mind that A 
is often found to be the most important driver of economic growth, one can then go 
ahead and subject the measures obtained for ln A and ∆ ln A to further examination. 
  Following Lindh and Malmberg (1999) as well as Feyrer (2007), I specifically as-
sume that q is influenced – mainly through the TFP parameter A – by the age composi-
tion of the labour force, implying that the latter may have an impact on productivity 
levels, while changes in the age composition of the active population may then affect 
productivity growth. I therefore construct an index representing the age composition of 
the labour force, Λ, with 







where Ls is the share of age group s in the total labour force. Inserting (5) in (3) and (4) 
via the assumption that A = γ Λ yields a decomposition of the TFP residual, 
    , ln ln ln ln ∑ + = + =
s
sit s it it it it L Λ A β γ γ  (6) 
or, in terms of first differences, 
    , ln ln ∑ ∆ + ∆ = ∆
s
sit s it it L A β γ  (7) 
which easily lend themselves as testable hypotheses. To obtain regression equations, 
one simply has to split ln γit into a constant γ (that disappears when differencing), a 
time-invariant country fixed effect λi, and a pure time trend µt, and add an error term εit. 
Before turning to estimating the model, however, a few more reflections regarding the 
theoretical background and some more technical aspects of its estimation may be useful. 
  Note, first of all, that the assumption that the TFP residual A is a function of (the 
structure of) L, makes the theoretical model converge to a model of endogenous growth   9
in the tradition of Lucas (1988) and Uzawa (1965), with human capital as an engine of 
TFP growth. (I will further look into this feature in Section 4.2.) Up to a point, this is at 
odds with the application of the basic growth-accounting framework, which is necessary 
to measure A in the first place, as it implies that there are super-linearities linked to one 
of the production factors entering the F(⋅)-functional. One way out of this dilemma is to 
interpret the above model as a model of transitional growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1995), such that the TFPs measured for each country would not reflect genuine techno-
logical progress (“inventions”), but the current state of technology adoption (“innova-
tion”). In a process of universal convergence, the uniform production possibilities fron-
tier itself would then not depend on the age composition of the labour force. Alterna-
tively, one may simply accept the internal inconsistency of the theoretical model, as 
there is no other way to isolate A, and take it to yield an imperfect test on whether there 
is genuine endogenous growth linked to L and its age composition. 
  Second, from a technical point of view, the model suggested here for empirical test-
ing has a number of nice features. The age-structure variables which are considered the 
main determinants of TFP and TFP growth are not likely to be endogenously linked to 
the dependent variables, as they are essentially determined by decisions taken some 20 
to 60 years ago.
11 This avoids problems regarding the direction of causality that are no-
torious with respect to many other potential determinants of output or output growth, 
such as trade, investment, education, political institutions, etc. Also, unlike other vari-
ables that are plausibly exogenous, such as geographical characteristics, demographic 
variables not only exhibit variation across countries but also considerable time-series 
variation, at least in the industrialized world. Serial correlation, another potential prob-
lem that typically plagues time-series analyses of the determinants of output, is naturally 
being dealt with in this set-up when switching to first differences, not as a technical 
response but as a variant of the model which has a material interpretation. Provided it 
exists in the level-estimates based on equation (6), the problem of serial correlation is 
also mitigated by the fact that I effectively use data collected at 5-year intervals. 
  Finally, I am mainly interested in the role of the age composition of the labour force 
for TFP and TFP growth. The work by Brandner and Dowrick (1994) or Ahituv (2001) 
suggests that changes in demographic variables may also affect saving and investment, 
                                            
11  This is certainly true with respect to (past) fertility rates and their impact on the current age composi-
tion of the labour force, probably less so with respect to migration. But one may take the role of migra-
tion which has taken place very recently to be of small significance for the observable age composition 
of the active population. This is shown in Feyrer (2007) using lagged workforce and population data. 
  To some extent, participation rates could be influenced by the current economic situation of a country, 
hence by the level and growth rate of its TFP. It is however not clear that this also distorts the age 
structure of the labour force which actually enters the following estimates. In any case, it has been 
ruled out in Feyrer (2007) who uses pure population shares as potentially unbiased instruments.   10
hence the entire time path of the physical capital stock (see Section 2.2). Similar things 
may apply to the stock of human capital. Estimates regarding the role of demographic 
change for economic development could therefore be biased if these alternative chan-
nels were not taken into account. To check whether this potential bias exists, and also to 
determine the relative importance of the impact of the age composition on TFP, running 
additional regressions regarding the impact on the broader productivity measure q and 
∆ q and on any of the components of equations (3) and (4) may thus be useful. 
 
4  Data and estimates 
4.1 Demographics, TFP and TFP growth 
The data base which has been set up for this study spans a time frame from 1960 to 
2000 at 5-year intervals and covers a maximum of 106 countries, among them 27 
OECD countries which are taken to represent the developed world.
12 As both growth 
experience and current demographic trends in most developed countries differ from 
those in the rest of the world, I exploit the larger “all countries” panel including as many 
observations as possible to avoid a selection bias, but run separate regressions for the 
OECD countries to see whether they show any peculiarities. 
  The estimates rely to a great deal on measures and procedures that have been devel-
oped in recent empirical growth research. Throughout, I amend data used in earlier 
work and re-construct transformations, intermediate estimations etc. from scratch. Spe-
cifically, the productivity measure  it q  that serves as a starting point for calculating the 
TFP residual is output per worker as constructed in the Penn World Tables (“PWT 6.2”, 
Heston et al. 2006). Capital per worker  it k  is calculated applying a “perpetual-inven-
tory” method to PWT 6.2 data following Easterly and Levine (2000),
13 and κit is simply 
defined as kit / qit. Human capital per worker is measured as  ) ( it s
it e h φ = , following Hall 
and Jones (1999) and using data regarding educational attainments provided by Barro 
and Lee (2001) and returns to schooling provided by Psacharopoulos (1994).
14 Based on 
evidence from a host of international studies, capital’s share of output, α, is simply as-
sumed to be 1/3 (see, e.g., Gollin 2002). 
                                            
12  For a list of the countries covered, see Appendix A.2. 
13  The value of the initial capital stock per worker is estimated to be i / (g + δ) q0; the investment share i is 
calculated as a 10-year average from 1960 onward (later if data become available only later); “steady-
state” growth g is calculated as a weighted 10-year average of the economy’s aggregate growth rate 
and the world growth rate of aggregate output; the depreciation rate δ is assumed to be 7 %; and initial 
output per worker q0 is a 3-year average (for further details, see Easterly and Levine 2000, footnote 3). 
14  Here, sit are average years of schooling in the active population; the function φ (s) is piecewise linear 
over years of schooling at different levels; it exhibits decreasing returns to higher education and is thus 
similar to the education-related components of a Mincerian wage regression (see Section 2.3).   11
  Like in Feyrer (2007), the age composition of the labour force is measured by the 
relative size of 10-year age groups (L10–19, L20–29, etc., representing the share of 
those aged 10–19, 20–29, etc. in the active population). Data are taken from the ILO’s 
(2007) LABORSTA database, where they are available at 10-year intervals. To run es-
timates based on 5-year intervals, missing values are imputed using data on the age 
structure of total population that are provided by the UN Population Division (2006). 
  The results of a series of estimates that are based on equation (6), relating to the TFP 
residual in levels, are summarized in Table 1.
15 Specifications that differ from Model 1 
(“M 1”) to Model 6 (“M 6”) are meant to explore, first, how much additional structure is 
needed for a simple regression of the TFP term on the L-variables to yield meaningful 
results and, second, how robust these results are with respect to alternative estimation 
procedures. M 1 is a simple OLS regression, with all the available data simply pooled 
together, while M 2 adds country dummies and M 3, in addition, time dummies.
16 Al-
lowing for country-specific effects contributes substantially to improving the overall fit 
and shapes the results regarding age-structure variables L10–19 through L60+ much 
more clearly. (L40–49 is omitted from the regression and serves as a reference group, 
the coefficients for the other L-variables measuring effects relative to those of this 
prime-aged group of workers.) Introducing time dummies does not do much to increase 
the explanatory power of the model. It further modifies the pattern of the L-coefficients, 
but does not change their structure altogether. 
  To understand the progress from M 1 to M 3 more fully, it is important to keep in 
mind what the inclusion of time and country-specific effects implies in the present 
framework. Note, first of all, that all cross-country differences in output and productiv-
ity that are due to differences in investment in physical and human capital have already 
been taken into account when calculating the TFP residual. The estimates therefore fo-
cus on differences in productivity, both over time and across countries, that are not ex-
plained by factor accumulation alone. Including time dummies in the estimation then 
allows for TFP levels to vary over time with trend growth rates that are common to all 
the countries considered. Including country-level dummies means that individual coun-
tries may be away, some more and some less, from the current technology frontier de-
fined at a global level. Against this background, additional effects of the age-structure 
variables indicate that the composition of the labour force may matter for closing, or 
widening, the gap to the world productivity frontier, for instance, by playing a role for 
the adoption and use of new technologies. Later on, I will check whether the age com- 
                                            
15  See Appendix A.3 for descriptive statistics related to the variables used in the analysis. 
16  To control for heterogeneity across countries in a rough fashion, M 1 includes dummies for OECD 
countries and a subset of “least” developed countries as additional regressors. With the introduction of 
country dummies, these broader controls can be dropped.   12
Table 1: The age composition of the labour force and TFP  
 
  M 1  M 2  M 3  (a)        M 4        (b) 
Sample  All Countries  All Countries  All Countries  All Countries  OECD 
Estimation method  Pooled OLS  OLS  OLS  Robust OLS
 a) Robust  OLS
 a) 































L40–49  (ref.  group)       




















Year dummies  –No  –No  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –No  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 






























Observations  –858  –858  –858  –858  –233 
Countries  –106  –106  –106  –106  ––27 
(Adj.) R²  –38.8%  –84.7%  –86.4%  –88.2%  –87.7% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
 
position of the labour force of a given country also matters for persistent differences in 
trend growth rates, which could point to a potential role of demographics for techno-
logical inventions and the position of the technological frontier itself. 
  Model M 4 is very similar to M 3. Now, however, residuals are clustered by coun-
tries as a means to avoid potential distortions of the standard errors through serial corre-
lation. Estimated coefficients are unchanged against M 3, showing a pronounced age-
related pattern of the impact of the L-variables on the log-TFP measure. What is more 
interesting for the moment is that the significance of these effects is next to unaffected. 
Four of the five age-structure variables are significant in the regression relating to all   13
Table 1 (cont’d.): The age composition of the labour force and TFP   
 
  (a)           M 5            (b)  (a)           M 6            (b) 
Sample  All Countries  OECD  All Countries  OECD 
Estimation method  OLS (fixed effects) OLS (fixed effects) GLS (random eff.)  GLS (random eff.)










































Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 








Observations  –858  –233  –858  –233 
Countries  –106  ––27  –106  ––27 
R² overall  –32.7%  ––5.7%  –35.2%  ––6.4% 
     Within  –14.5%  –40.6%  –14.1%  –40.4% 
     Between  –35.3%  ––0.1%  –39.5%  ––0.2% 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
 
countries in the sample. The same is true for an otherwise identical regression based on 
OECD countries only. Additional tests reveal that, in models M 4a and M 4b, all coeffi-
cients of the five L-variables are jointly significant at a 1-percent level for all countries, 
at a 5-percent level in the case of OECD countries.
17 
  The search for an appropriate specification is continued in M 5, a genuine fixed-
effects model. Apart from the constant, the coefficients are identical to those of M 3 and 
M 4, and their significance turns out to be as high as in M 3, that is, without the adjust-
ment in standard errors through clustered residuals. At the same time, the assumption of 
country-level fixed effects
18 takes away some of the explanatory power of the other re-
                                            
17  The F-test on joint significance of all the L-variables rejects the Null hypothesis that they are all equal 
to zero with prob > F = 0.0015 for model M 4a. With M 4b, the test statistic is prob > F = 0.0412. 
18  These effects are jointly significant at a 1-percent level in both versions of model M 5.   14
gressors. In the regression covering all countries, this can be seen from the moderate 
results regarding “R² within” (measuring the model’s fit over time for a given country) 
and the new, combined measure of the “overall R²” (over time and across countries). In 
the OECD regression, the “within” fit is still rather high. All these observations are not 
uncommon in a context like the present one. M 6 is a random-effects specification using 
the generalized least squares (GLS) method for analysing the otherwise unchanged 
model. The results are qualitatively unchanged against M 3 through M 5. More impor-
tantly, additional tests do not support the random-effects specification.
19 In the light of 
these results, I am thus inclined to consider M 4 – which yields quantitatively the same 
results regarding the L-coefficients as M3 and M5 – as the final specification of the pre-
sent TFP-in-levels estimation and use it as a baseline for further analyses. 
  A major result of the estimates thus far is that the coefficients for L10–19 through 
L60+ exhibit a highly remarkable pattern. Age-related TFP contributions clearly peak 
for workers in their 40s, as the coefficients for all other age groups turn out to be nega-
tive. In the all-countries regression, the overall pattern is in fact of a perfect, inverse U-
shape, resembling that of a standard Mincer-type wage regression. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1.
20 In the OECD-variant of M 4, the pattern is less pronounced in general, and 
there appears to be a deviation from the inverse U-shape related to those aged 20–29. 
(Note, however, that the point estimate is only borderline-significant in this case.) Thus, 
if one were to take age-related wage profiles as indicating age-specific productivity dif-
ferentials that are observable at an individual level and can be internalized through 
wages, the structure of contributions of each age group to TFP would exhibit a similar 
structure. Yet, the differential impact on TFP appears to be much stronger, pointing to 
quantitatively important “growth externalities” by which the age composition of the 
entire labour force of a given country matters a lot for technology adoption and, hence, 
for levels and movements of total factor productivity. 
  Moving from level accounting to growth accounting in its genuine form, I now look 
at equation (7), investigating whether changes in the age composition of the labour force 
have an impact on TFP growth which is in line with the results derived from the level- 
equation (6). The new results are summarized in Table 2. Note that, in this case, none of 
the estimations allows for a constant. M 7 also does not include country dummies and is 
thus equivalent to the baseline model M 4: the common assumption is that the trend 
                                            
19  The Hausman test clearly rejects that country-specific effects are uncorrelated with the other explana-
tory variables. The Breusch-Pagan test confirms that there is no autocorrelation in the country-specific 
effects. Both these results imply that the country-level effects are not randomly distributed. 
20  For a typical Mincerian wage regression, Figure 1 draws on results reported in Fenge et al. (2006), 
based on German micro-data. For illustrative purposes, the age-related relative contributions of each 
age group to the level of TFP are assessed based on the estimates derived from model M 4a above, us-
ing the year-2000 age structure of the German labour force.   15
























































Mincerian wage profile (males)
Mincerian wage profile (females)
Age-specific contribution to q via TFP
 
Sources: Fenge et al. (2006) for wage profiles; own calculations based on Model M 4a. 
On the black curve, points representing the results of model M 4a are filled if the underlying estimate is 
significant. The estimate for the 50–59 group is not significant. 
 
growth rate is determined by the global technology frontier and is thus the same across 
countries, while the demographic structure of the labour force may speed up, or slow 
down, convergence. The alternative model with country dummies, M 8, allows for trend 
growth rates that would permanently differ across countries, potentially giving demo-
graphics an additional role as a true driving force of technological progress, not merely 
a role for technology adoption. 
  Table 2 shows that the results of M 7 are basically in line with those of M 4. In the 
all-countries version of the estimation, three of the five L-variables are significant by 
themselves for explaining TFP growth, and they are jointly significant at a close-to-1-
percent level.
21 Results for the OECD sub-sample are weaker in both respects, suggest-
ing that demographics alone are less important for TFP growth in industrialized coun-
tries than they are in the rest of the world. Most importantly, however, the age-related 
pattern of the impact of the age composition of the labour force on a given country’s 
growth rate of TFP remains largely unchanged for both samples. Things are different 
with respect to M 8, the variant with country dummies. Here, the significance of esti-
mates for the L-variables largely vanishes, and only in the OECD-variant the L-coeffi- 
                                            
21  The F-test on joint significance of all the L-variables yields prob > F = 0.0153 for model M 7a and 
prob > F = 0.1054 for model M 7b.   16
Table 2: Changes in the age composition of the labour force and TFP growth   
 
  (a)           M 7            (b)  (a)           M 8            (b) 
Sample  All Countries  OECD  All Countries  OECD 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) Robust  OLS
 a) Robust  OLS
 a) Robust  OLS
 a) 
Dep. variable: ∆  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A 
























∆ L40–49 (ref. group)      
















Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –No – No  –Yes  –Yes 
Observations  –752  –206  –752  –206 
Countries  –102  ––27  –102  ––27 
R²  –8.4%  –33.9%  –23.3%  –42.2% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
 
cients still exhibit a clear-cut, age-related pattern. What is probably more interesting is 
that most of the country dummies turn out to be significant, but the overwhelming ma-
jority of the coefficients are in a very narrow band ranging from 0.1 to 0.2 in M 8a, 
from 0.0 to 0.05 in M 8b. It appears that, once the impact of demographics on growth 
performance is controlled for, strong cross-country differences in trend growth rates are 
not supported by the data. 
  To put the results in a broader perspective and test for alternative channels of the 
impact of labour-force demographics on productivity and productivity growth, I finally 
use equations (3) and (4) and regress all of their components on the vector of L-
variables. The results of these estimations are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
22 All of 
the findings reported there point to a first-order importance of the TFP channel for the 
                                            
22  The columns representing results for ln A and ∆ ln A in Tables 3 and 4 are identical with those of mod-
els M 4a, M 4b, M 7a and M 7b, respectively.   17
Table 3: The composition of the impact of demographics on productivity  
 
  (a)                            (b)           M 9           (c)                            (d) 
Sample All  Countries 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) 










































Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –Yes – Yes  –Yes  –Yes 








Observations  –858  –858  –858  –858 
Countries  –106  –106  –106  –106 
R²  –96.4%  –88.2%  –86.6%  –96.9% 
  
  (e)                            (f)           M 9           (g)                            (h) 
Sample OECD 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) 










































Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –Yes – Yes  –Yes  –Yes 








Observations  –233  –233  –233  –233 
Countries  ––27  ––27  ––27  ––27 
R²  –94.6%  –87.7%  –89.3%  –93.8% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.)   18
Table 4: The composition of the impact of demographics on productivity growth 
 
  (a)                           (b)          M 10          (c)                            (d) 
Sample All  Countries 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) 
Dep. variable: ∆  ∆ ln q  ∆ ln A  α/(1–α) ∆ ln κ  ∆ ln h 
























∆ L40–49 (ref. group)      
















Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –No – No – No – No 
Observations  –752  –752  –752  –752 
Countries  –102  –102  –102  –102 
R²  –27.7%  –8.4%  –23.6%  –42.4% 
  
  (e)                           (f)          M 10          (g)                            (h) 
Sample OECD 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) 
Dep. variable: ∆  ∆ ln q  ∆ ln A  α/(1–α) ∆ ln κ  ∆ ln h 
























∆ L40–49 (ref. group)      
















Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –No – No – No – No 
Observations  –206  –206  –206  –206 
Countries  ––27  ––27  ––27  ––27 
R²  –73.6%  –33.9%  –52.3%  –45.0% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
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observed impact of the age composition of the labour force on output per worker and its 
development over time. Note that, by construction, coefficients for ln q and ∆ ln q equal 
the sum of the coefficients related to ln A or ∆ ln A, α/(1–α) ln κ, etc. 
  It is easy to see that the L-coefficients related to the TFP-measure are always sub-
stantially larger than coefficients related to the capital coefficient and human capital. 
Also, in the estimations for κ and h, almost none of the L-coefficients are significant. In 
fact, they are all insignificant in model M10, i.e., for the variables in first differences, 
α/(1–α) ∆ ln κ and ∆ ln h. Only in the level-estimate for all countries, the age-structure 
variable relating to the youngest group of workers, L10–19, yields a significant estimate 
with respect to the human-capital stock measure, ln h. In the OECD-version, the same is 
true with respect to the capital coefficient, α/(1–α) ln κ. In both cases, the coefficients 
are negative. The first of these results is easily understood. Outside the OECD world, 
labour-force participation of young adults is sometimes substantial, but this reduces the 
level of final educational attainments of the entire labour force. The second result points 
to a negative relationship between the relative size of the cohort of workers who are just 
entering the labour force and the current capital coefficient which, in turn, contributes to 
a lower level of output per worker. Up to a point, this may reflect the “capital-dilution” 
effect of a growing labour force, probably the “baby boomers”, for productivity that was 
discussed in Section 2. There may thus be a limited influence of demographics on factor 
accumulation, as was also found by Brandner and Dowrick (1994) or Ahituv (2001), but 
it appears to be next to negligible vis-à-vis the strong impact on total factor productivity. 
  All in all, the findings thus far basically confirm the results obtained by Feyrer 
(2007) based on an up-dated sample with a longer time series, pointing to a significant 
role of the age composition of a given country’s labour force for both the level and the 
growth rate of output per worker. Furthermore, the observation that this effect mainly 
works via TFP, not via factor accumulation, can be taken to indicate that labour-force 
demographics are effectively a major determinant of (transitory) endogenous growth. 
 
4.2 Extensions: Is there also a role of human capital? 
Due to the nature of the macro-level data that are used, the foregoing analysis is certain-
ly rough in many respects. It is prone to a number of measurement errors, and it pro-
vides little detail that could be helpful in identifying the mechanisms at work behind the 
results. I have argued before (in Section 2.3) that macroeconomic data are nevertheless 
the appropriate level for investigating age-related productivity differentials. The results 
so far clearly support this view as they highlight a strong role of labour-force demo-
graphics for TFP and its growth. I will now discuss some of the potential limitations of 
this finding and then try to shed a little more light on how it may actually be driven.   20
  As the TFP-measure is determined residually, everything that is not accounted for 
when calculating it, i.e., everything not included in the κ and h-terms in equation (3), is 
– probably wrongly – attributed to ln A. Here, two aspects of this well-known problem 
may deserve a little more attention. First, for countries where not only the accumulation 
of physical and human capital, but also the exploitation of natural resources plays a ma-
jor role for economic development, the TFP-measure may be distorted. As a prominent 
example, one may therefore use various definitions to identify oil-exporting countries 
and exclude them from the sample while re-doing the level-estimates based on model 
M 4. The results are basically unchanged against those reported in Table 1.
23 Second, 
productivity is defined on per-worker terms throughout the above calculations. There-
fore, if the average number of hours worked has declined over time this may create an-
other distortion, mainly affecting calculated changes in TFP. Unfortunately, longer time 
series of data regarding this issue which also cover a sufficiently large number of coun-
tries are lacking. Essentially, such data exist only for OECD countries where, at the 
same time, changes of this kind may have been most prominent over the last few dec-
ades. In this case, it has already been demonstrated by Feyrer (2007) that controlling for 
these changes leaves the structure of coefficients, hence the estimated impact of labour-
force demographics on TFP growth, essentially unaffected. 
  If, therefore, one takes the results presented in Section 4.1 as what they are – a clear 
indication that demographic ageing may matter for productivity and TFP growth – the 
question as to why this is so moves to the fore. By themselves, the estimates say nothing 
on how to answer this question. There may be a number of plausible stories that could 
be told to motivate the observed pattern of age-specific contributions to TFP and its 
growth (see Section 6 fur further discussion). But, either because macro-level data are 
lacking which could be used to illustrate their potential significance or because one 
would really have to investigate them at the micro level, none of these stories can be 
subjected to closer scrutiny through relevant extensions of the present analysis. Yet, 
there is one natural extension of the framework I have utilized so far which appears to 
be feasible. In accordance with the Lucas–Uzawa model of endogenous growth, not 
only the structure of the labour force (measured through the L-variables) but also their 
human capital (that is, age-specific values of h10–19, h20–29, etc.) might affect the TFP 
residual. Since individuals well into their 20s are still in the process of accumulating 
                                            
23  See Appendix A.4. If anything, the age-related pattern of TFP contributions becomes even more pro-
nounced when more and more oil-exporting countries are dropped. Note that results for the L-variables 
are jointly significant at the 1-percent level in all cases but the last one, where they are only close to 
being so. In this case, the definition of “oil-exporters” is extreme in that it encompasses all countries 
where, more than once in the 1960–2000 period, the share of fuel exports in total merchandise exports 
was in the top third of the annual global distribution of these shares. Since countries where foreign-
trade data are lacking are also omitted, more than half of the observations are lost.   21
human capital, while older workers often have lower final educational attainments than 
their successors, the entire age-related pattern of TFP contributions could therefore, at 
least partly, be driven by cohort effects located in this specific area. 
  To investigate this idea more closely, data on educational attainments by age groups 
are needed that have a similar coverage as the data panel I have been using. Once more, 
data of this kind are nowhere provided directly. It is difficult, though possible, however, 
to re-cover such information from the Barro–Lee (2001) dataset I already used to ac-
count for human-capital accumulation in the TFP calculations. The data that result from 
a series of transformations
24 have a number of limitations. Most importantly, they can-
not reflect the full age-related variation of educational attainments for the entire sample 
period, as more and more entries for older age groups have to be set to uniform averages 
when moving backward in time. Also, the resulting data may effectively convey some 
noise, especially in the case of non-OECD countries where educational attainments are 
often low and formal education processes do not follow a strongly standardized timing. 
                                            
24  The data set on educational attainments constructed by Barro and Lee (2001) offers two series of re-
sults, one for the population aged 15 and above – which I have used in calculating ln h – and one for 
the population aged 25 and above. Educational attainments of those aged 15–24 should therefore be 
given by h15–24 = (h15+ Pop15+ – h25+ Pop25+) / (Pop15–24); detailed population data are taken from the UN 
Population Division’s (2006) data base which shows only minimal deviations from the figures for 
Pop15+ and Pop25+ provided by Barro and Lee (2001). In line with the timing of human-capital accu-
mulation assumed by Barro and Lee (2001, eq. (6)–(9), viz. that 15–19 year olds are beyond primary 
education, half way through secondary education and have no tertiary education; that 20–24-year olds 
are beyond secondary education and half way through tertiary education), one can then infer final, or 
full, educational attainments of those currently aged 15–24 and consider these constant from age 25 
onward. Thus, c h15–24, t = h25–34, t+10 = h35–44, t+20, etc., where c is a conversion factor which is based on 
the assumptions just mentioned and on the proportions of the relevant age groups. This yields a series 
of educational attainments by age groups which runs from 1960 to 2000 for those aged 15–24 but, un-
fortunately, covers those aged 55–64 only in the year 2000. In other words, relying on data resulting 
from these transformations only I would largely lose the time-series dimension. 
  To overcome this serious limitation without doing violence to the data that are in place, I therefore 
take a second step. Based on hX+ = (h15+ Pop15+ – h<X Pop<X) / (PopX+) I impute adjusted figures for av-
erage educational attainments to all groups aged X and above for which these data are missing. This 
certainly implies a loss in potential variation across age groups, but does not rely on any additional 
conjectures that might not be supported by the original data. Only, with the population measured in 
1,000s and educational attainments measured as average years of schooling (differentiated by levels) 
with just one decimal digit, this procedure is susceptible to relatively large rounding errors, especially 
where average educational attainments are close to zero. I thus drop a limited number of results that 
are either implausibly low (< –0.2) or exceed the highest figures observed for 2000. Remaining nega-
tive figures are set to zero. Note that, in general, rounding errors should produce noise, but generate no 
systematic biases. In any case, I will also use only non-imputed figures for robustness checks. 
  As the last step to take I switch from results for “odd” age groups (15–24 etc.) to “even” ones (10–19 
etc.) in a straightforward way. Without making any further assumptions regarding cohort effects at the 
level of 5-year age groups, but taking into account the Barro–Lee assumptions regarding the standard-
ized timing of human-capital accumulation, I use population-weighted averages of h15–24 and h25–34 etc. 
for adjacent age groups and determine the end points h15–19 and h60–64 residually. Finally, I take the lat-
ter two results to apply to workers aged 10–19 and 60+, respectively, as labour-force participation 
among those aged less than 15 or 65 and above is usually low.   22
As a further limitation for any in-depth analysis, the number of observations I am using 
is limited from the out-set, definitely in the OECD sample, and therefore does not easily 
allow for introducing a multitude of additional regressors. To deal with this problem, I 
therefore run two series of regressions, one where I add a full set of age-specific human-
capital variables (h10–19 through h60+) to the baseline models defined in Section 4.1 
and one where I use each of these variables in turn, but only one at a time. 
 The  h-variables are defined as age-specific educational attainments derived from the 
Barro and Lee (2001) data, converted into a comprehensive human-capital measure fol-
lowing Hall and Jones (1999).
25 They are then divided by the average stock of human 
capital per worker in each country and year in order to remove correlations between 
them and to avoid that, when used in isolation, they are simply a proxy for average hu-
man capital.
26 As a complement of the shares of each age group in the labour force cap-
tured by the regressors L10–19 etc., the h10–19s etc. thus reflect the relative level of 
qualifications of individuals in any of these groups. Tables 5 and 6 report on the results 
of estimations which augment models M 4 and M 7 in the way just described.
27 
  Models M 11 and M 12 which use age-specific measures of human capital as addi-
tional regressors essentially show two things. First, cohort effects in educational attain-
ments appear to play some role in determining both TFP levels and TFP growth. But 
second, they never make the strong age-related pattern of the L-coefficients disappear. 
When the h-variables are thrown in, the age profile for the L-variables becomes a bit 
less pronounced but, at the same time, gets sharper in terms of significance.
28 By them 
selves, the -coefficients show no clear, age-related pattern. But taken in isolation, they 
are jointly significant in the growth-estimates in models M 11h and M 12h and there are 
also a number of significant estimates for human capital of single age groups. 
  The regressions bundled in Tables 5 and 6 should be read as follows. The columns 
where all the h-variables are present are what I really want to look at. Due to the rela-
tively large number of regressors, however, significance and (insignificant) signs of the 
                                            
25  See footnote 24 on the way the Barro–Lee data are being used and footnote 14 for further details re-
garding the human-capital measure suggested by Hall and Jones (1999). 
26  Regressions on human-capital data without this normalization do not look very different. 
27  For comparison, Appendix A.5 lists the results for Models M 4 and M 7 when, in each case, the sam-
ple is restricted to observations which also enter the human-capital augmented regressions. Also, as 
one may doubt the validity of the imputations of missing human-capital data explained in footnote 24, 
Appendix A.6 reports on parallel regressions using only non-imputed data. To the extent that these re-
sults can be compared at all to those provided in Tables 5 and 6, they are much in line with them. 
28  This can be seen by comparing M 11 and M 12 to their counterparts in Appendix A.5. The L-coeffi-
cients are jointly significant in all of the models M  11a, M  11h, M  12a and M  12h (with prob > 
F = 0.0214, prob > F = 0.0838, prob > F = 0.0360 and prob > F = 0.0353, respectively). They are also 
jointly significant in models M 4g, M 7c and M 7d (with prob > F = 0.0238, prob > F = 0.0480 and 
prob > F = 0.0666, respectively), but not in M 4h.   23
Table 5: The age distribution of human capital and TFP   
 
  (a)              (b)               (c)            M 11 (d)          (e)                (f)              (g) 
Sample All  countries 
Estim. Method  Robust OLS
 a) 












































































     
h20–29  –1.425** 
–(0.618) 
  –0.157 
–(0.156) 
    
h30–39 –1.464** 
–(0.735) 
  –0.003 
–(0.158) 
   
h40–49  –1.330** 
–(0.588) 





    –0.006 
–(0.097) 
 
h60+  –0.187 
–(0.145) 
     – 0 . 0 4 5  
–(0.066) 
Year dummies  –Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes 















Observations  –815  –823  –823  –835  –841  –834  –831 
Countries  –103  –103  –103  –103  –103  –103  –103 
R²  –88.1%  –87.6%  –87.6%  –87.6%  –87.7%  –87.8%  –87.9% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
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Table 5 (cont’d.): The age distribution of human capital and TFP 
 
  (h)              (i)               (j)           M 11 (k)           (l)                (m)             (n) 
Sample OECD 
Estim. Method  Robust OLS
 a) 

















































































    
h30–39  –0.796 
–(0.635) 
  –0.128 
–(0.118) 
   
h40–49 –0.718 
–(0.563) 
   –0.157 
–(0.125) 
  
h50–59  –0.697 
–(0.449) 





     – 0 . 0 3 0  
–(0.061) 
Year dummies  –Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes 















Observations  –217  –219  –219  –225  –231  –228  –228 
Countries  ––27  ––27  ––27  ––27  ––27  ––27  ––27 
R²  –88.0%  –88.0%  –87.8%  –87.8%  –88.1%  –87.7%  –87.7% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
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Table 6: Changes in the age distribution of human capital and TFP growth 
 
  (a)              (b)               (c)            M 12 (d)          (e)                (f)              (g) 
Sample All  countries 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) 
Dep. variable: ∆  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A 










































∆ L40–49 (ref. gr.)         
































     




    
∆ h30–39  –0.920** 
–(0.445) 
  –0.061 
–(0.084) 
   
∆ h40–49  –0.709* 
–(0.371) 
   – 0 . 0 6 0  
–(0.065) 
  
∆ h50–59  –0.623** 
–(0.277) 
    –0.145** 
–(0.069) 
 
∆ h60+  –0.107 
–(0.093) 
     – 0 . 0 6 2  
–(0.046) 
Year dummies  –Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes 
Country dummies  –No – No  –No – No  –No  –No  –No 
Observations  –701  –714  –714  –731  –738  –726  –721 
Countries  –100  –100  –100  –100  –100  –100  –100 
R²  –10.3%  –8.2%  –9.0%  –8.3%  –8.3%  –8.9%  –8.4% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
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Table 6 (cont’d.): Changes in the age distribution of human capital and TFP growth 
 
  (h)              (i)               (j)            M 12 (k)          (l)                (m)             (n) 
Sample OECD 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 a) 
Dep. variable: ∆  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A 










































∆ L40–49 (ref. gr.)         
































     
∆ h20–29  –0.022 
–(0.414) 
  –0.241** 
–(0.093) 
    
∆ h30–39  –0.141 
–(0.444) 
  –0.174* 
–(0.092) 
   
∆ h40–49  –0.240 
–(0.487) 
   –0.006 
–(0.077) 
  
∆ h50–59  –0.137 
–(0.341) 
    –0.128** 
–(0.058) 
 
∆ h60+  –0.097 
–(0.138) 
     – 0 . 0 5 1  
–(0.038) 
Year dummies  –Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes 
Country dummies  –No – No  –No – No  –No  –No  –No 
Observations  –185  –188  –188  –197  –204  –199  –199 
Countries  ––26  ––26  ––26  ––26  ––26  ––26  ––26 
R²  –38.9%  –34.8%  –35.7%  –33.7%  –32.0%  –34.5%  –34.3% 
a)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
 
estimates may be obscured. The additional regressions, each with just one h-variable, 
may therefore serve as robustness checks. Only if results for the hs of single age groups 
are basically the same in both cases, they may be fully trustworthy. Also, because of the 
smaller number of observations, the models generally perform weaker for OECD coun-  27
tries than they do for the all-countries sample. Besides the finding that the age structure 
of human capital may generally matter for TFP and TFP growth, this leaves us with a 
potentially positive effect relating to human capital of workers in their 20s and a poten-
tially negative effect for workers in their 50s. By the definition of h10–19 etc., these 
results are difficult to interpret, certainly with respect to TFP-levels. Yet, they may re-
flect that relatively high qualifications of younger workers, with those aged 25 usually 
reaching their final level of educational attainments, point to a current improvement in 
human capital; that relatively high qualifications of older workers result from a (tempo-
rary) decline in educational attainments of new labour-market entrants which has been 
observed in a number of developing countries, especially among former colonies. 
  Up to a point, these extensions beyond purely demographic effects are therefore 
instructive in themselves. In the final analysis, however, they mainly reinforce that there 
is a strong impact, with a particular age-related shape, of labour-force demographics on 
TFP, labour productivity and, hence, on economic growth in general, as was already 
shown in Section 4.1. 
 
5 Illustrative  simulations 
It has already been stated that, for a given country and a given time period, the current 
age composition of the labour force is largely pre-determined by fertility decisions that 
were taken up to six decades ago. Also, demographics exhibit a substantial amount of 
variation, both over time and across countries, even if one limits attention to the small 
group of highly developed countries. To illustrate the relevance of the findings in this 
paper, I will therefore round off the foregoing econometric analyses with a number of 
simulations that are meant to show how economic development could be influenced by 
future demographic change in the US, Japan, Germany, the UK, and France. These are 
the five largest OECD economies in terms of GDP, and expected changes in the struc-
ture of the labour force as well as the entire population are rather diverse. 
  The estimates based on models M 4 and M 7 imply that the age composition of the 
labour force affects levels of TFP and that changes in this composition lead to devia-
tions from TFP trend growth at a national level, while trend growth as such is basically 
the same across all countries. Using the results obtained for model M 7b (referring to 
the OECD sample),
29 I can therefore start the exercise by simulating predicted devia-
tions from trend productivity growth implied in current demographic projections (com-
bined with current age-specific participation rates which are simply held constant) over 
                                            
29  Simulations derived from the all-countries regression would not be altogether different. Only, due to 
stronger variation in the L-coefficients, the profiles obtained would be even more pronounced than in 
the OECD variant which is used for Figure 2 and for all subsequent simulation results shown here.   28
the next four decades.
30 I can then combine the results with aggregate figures for em-
ployment and total population implied in the same projections to translate them into 
predicted deviations from aggregate trend growth and trend growth per capita. The 
simulations are illustrated in Figure 2, effectively spanning the time period from 1990 to 
2050 to see how the predictions derived from the above estimations relate to actual de-
velopments over the last fifteen years. 
  According to these simulations, the five countries considered here are likely to be 
affected by changes in the age composition of their labour force in a different way. As 
to predictions for past and current developments, i.e., in the 1990–2005 sub-period, the 
estimates are able to explain, up to a point, the strong growth in productivity and aggre-
gate output that the US has seen in the 1990s and also the underperformance that Japan 
was faced with in the same period. In the UK, above-trend growth in the 1990s and a 
current return to more moderate growth rates could also be derived from the estimates. 
The model works less good for France and Germany, where it predicts above-trend 
growth for the periods from 1990–95 and from 1995 onward to the present, respec-
tively. In the case of France, some of this can probably be seen in relatively high growth 
rates of productivity and aggregate output in the late 1980s, while the German growth 
performance has been relatively weak during the entire period from 1995 to 2005. A 
possible interpretation of these observations is that, due to a number of structural prob-
lems, e.g., persistent labour-market rigidities, Germany has effectively been forgoing 
the opportunity of some demographically induced extra-growth which could have taken 
place over the last decade, when the German baby boomers entered their 40s. Now, that 
some of these rigidities have been removed, this effect may finally become apparent for 
a few more years. By contrast, the US may have been able to exploit a similar opportu-
nity during the 1990s, among other things because of their flexible labour markets.
31 
  As to projected developments from 2005 onward, any of the growth rates I am look-
ing at in Figure 2 is likely to exhibit much stronger fluctuations in Germany and Japan 
than it will in France, the UK and the US. Given lower past and current birth rates ob-
served in the two former countries and their consequences for the projected age compo-
sition of their labour force, this result is probably not too surprising. Note that, in these 
simulations, the econometric estimates presented in Section 4 directly lead to the pre-
dicted patterns of productivity growth, while results regarding aggregate and per-capita 
                                            
30  Population data and projections are taken from the 2006 release of the “World Population Prospects” 
prepared by the UN Population Division (2007, “constant-fertility” variant). Information regarding 
current activity rates is taken from the ILO (2007) LABORSTA database. 
31  Of course, this reasoning by no means implies that inflexible labour market institutions could also 
isolate a country against the downward risks for growth performance resulting from changes in the 
demographic structure which are projected to take place in the future.   29
Figure 2: The impact of projected demographic change on economic growth   



























































































































































































































































Sources: UN Population Division (2006; 2007), ILO (2007), author’s estimates. 
 
growth are obtained through additional calculations which, in themselves, involve little 
economics. The core result is that, due to projected changes in the age composition of 
their labour force, Germany as well as Japan will be faced with continued swings, both 
Productivity growth 
Aggregate output growth 
Per-capita output growth   30
up and down, in productivity growth. Developments differ between these two countries 
because Japan had an early, and rather strong, post-war baby boom and a two-stage de-
cline in birth rates afterwards,
32 while the German baby boom was late and rather weak, 
followed by a very fast reduction in birth rates. In both cases, the resulting shifts in the 
demographic structure of the working-age population are becoming smaller over time, 
but last until around 2040. France, the UK and also the US will have a labour force with 
a relatively stable age structure, once the cohorts of their baby boomers have retired. 
The US, with a much stronger and more long-lasting baby boom than elsewhere, will 
have to deal with substantial swings in the age composition of their labour force over 
the next ten to fifteen years; thereafter, the effect will fade out. In the UK the baby 
boom again was smaller and took place later, giving rise to limited swings until around 
2030. In France, where after an early and rather strong baby room birth rates never fell 
very low, there will be virtually no deviations from trend productivity growth caused by 
demographic shifts from 2005 onwards. 
  Simulated changes in productivity growth translate into lower rates of aggregate 
growth wherever the labour force must be expected to decline in the future, viz., in Ger-
many and Japan and, much less so, in France and the UK (see, again, Figure 2). In the 
US, the predicted demographic impact on aggregate growth rates is positive almost 
throughout, as there will be a projected increase in the labour force which is large 
enough to off-set any small, adverse effects for productivity. From an economist’s per-
spective, changes in aggregate growth that are due to demographic change are clearly 
less important than changes in the growth rate of per-capita output (see Section 2). It is 
therefore interesting to note that, in Germany and Japan, future simulated changes in 
per-capita growth are less pronounced than those in aggregate growth because, in these 
two countries, even total population is expected to decline in the future, although at a 
smaller rate than their labour force. Things are different with respect to France, the UK 
and the US. Mainly due to increasing longevity, total population will roughly stay con-
stant in the former two countries and will even increase at a higher rate than the labour 
force in the latter. In all three cases, per-capita output must therefore be expected to 
grow more slowly than aggregate output. 
  The simulations thus far demonstrate that changes in the age composition of the 
labour force can have sizable effects for annual growth rates of productivity, aggregate 
output and output per capita and that these effects may also show some diversity across 
                                            
32  In a sense, Japan has gone through the “first stage” of demographic transition, with a reduction in birth 
rates to a “replacement level” only in the short period between 1945 and 1955, while the same had 
happened around the beginning of the 20
th century in most other developed countries. As elsewhere, 
the Japanese birth rate started falling again in the mid-1970s – slower, but eventually to a lower level, 
than in Germany and, a fortiori, in the most other developed countries.   31
countries. Given that, I can go ahead and also simulate the accumulated effects of pro-
jected demographic change on future levels of output per capita in any of the countries 
considered here. I will do so under the assumption that, abstracting from the impact of 
demographics, economic growth in all developed countries would be driven by a con-
stant, uniform rate of trend productivity growth. This common rate of global techno-
logical progress is set at 1.5 per cent p.a. on real terms, which is about the average rate 
of annual real productivity growth in industrialized countries since 1990 (see OECD 
2007). It is then modified for each country using predicted deviations from trend pro-
ductivity growth as derived from the OECD regression (see Figure  2). Results are 
shown in Figure 3, illustrating the predicted time paths of output per capita for the pe-
riod from 2005 to 2050. 
  If, for each of the countries considered, the year-2005 level of per-capita output is 
set to 100, the fundamental rate of productivity growth assumed here implies that GDP 
per capita would largely double until 2050 in the case of a stable population (hence, 
constant productivity growth). In reality, populations are not expected to be stable in the 
sense that (a) the activity rate, i.e., the share of the labour force in total population, will 
vary over time, mainly through changes in old-age dependency, and (b) the age compo-
sition of the labour force will also change, affecting productivity in line with the esti-
mates presented above. Taken together, these two effects potentially create a “demo-
graphic gap” in terms of smaller output per capita which is highlighted in Figure 3 for 
the case of Germany, where this gap is effectively the largest among all countries con-
sidered here, closely followed by Japan. 
  As dependency ratios are projected to increase almost everywhere, per-capita output 
must be expected to grow at a lower rate than with a stable population structure in all 
the five countries considered here. This can be seen from the graphs representing future 
levels of per-capita output based on current population projections, but assuming that 
productivity growth would remain constant. This effect is weaker in the US than else-
where, while it is strong in France and, even more so, in Germany and Japan. However, 
what really makes a difference for the future development of output per capita in all 
these countries is the direction and size of the productivity effect of projected shifts in 
the age composition of the labour force. Its impact is again almost negligible in France 
and the UK, while it is clearly negative in the US until around 2025 – implying a reduc-
tion in accumulated per-capita growth that is never made up for during the rest of the 
time horizon of the simulations. The effect is even more negative, especially between 
2010 and 2025, in Germany, followed by a (transitional) recovery of accumulated per-
capita growth. In Japan, it turns out to be positive, at least for quite a while, with subse-
quent changes that move down and up again towards 2050.   32
Figure 3: The impact of projected demographic change on the level of output per   
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Sources: UN Population Division (2006; 2007), ILO (2007), author’s estimates. 
 
  In Germany, the total demographic gap could cost more than half of accumulated 
growth related to a stable population structure until 2020, almost two thirds of this ef-
fect being due to the impact of labour-force demographics on productivity. Between 
Trend growth with stable population 
P.-c. growth with const. prod. growth 
P.-c. growth, prod. growth adjusted  33
2010 and 2020, the negative impact of shifts in the age composition of the labour force 
could in fact imply that aggregate output remains largely constant on real terms if one is 
inclined to take the econometric findings seriously. Over the remaining simulation pe-
riod, the gap could then become relatively smaller, reducing per-capita output by “only” 
about 40 percent until 2050, of which 10 percentage points could be attributed to shifts 
in the age composition of the labour force. In the UK, France, and the US, the total 
demographic gap amounts to about 20, 25 and 30 percent, respectively, over the entire 
time horizon.
33 While in the former two countries, changes in the age structure basically 
play no role for this result, in the US, about 10 percentage points, or two fifths of the 
total effect, are related to the impact of the age composition of the labour force on pro-
ductivity. Until about 2020, this latter effect could be rather strong in the US, explaining 
about two thirds of the reduction in per-capita output as an implication of a very large 
cohort of baby boomers approaching and entering retirement. 
  In Japan, the demographic gap could amount to about 35 percent of accumulated 
growth in output per-capita until 2050. In this case, however, particular trends in the age 
composition of the labour force, which is relatively old already today, may first have a 
positive effect on accumulated productivity growth. In terms of per-capita growth, this 
may over-compensate the unfavourable trend in old-age dependency until around 2030. 
(Remember that the opposite may have been true for some time in the recent past; see 
Figure 2.) Only afterwards, the reduction in accumulated productivity growth through 
demographic shifts may bite, but the divergence between a scenario with constant pro-
ductivity growth and the one where productivity growth is adjusted in line with the 
above empirical estimates will again start to reduce the total demographic gap after 




In this paper, I have taken a closer look at the potential impact of changes in the age 
composition of the labour force, hence changes in past fertility rates, on the prospects 
for future economic growth in countries that are affected by demographic ageing. Build-
ing on the limited amount of existing literature that attempts to address this issue in an 
empirical framework, I found an effect that appears to be surprisingly strong, affecting 
productivity and productivity growth, and therefore goes beyond the simple arithmetic 
                                            
33  Note that in the US, the labour force is projected to grow substantially until 2050, implying that aggre-
gate growth may be higher than with a stable population. In the UK, the number of active individuals 
is projected to stay roughly constant in the long run, whereas in France it is expected to shrink, al-
though on a much smaller scale than in Germany.   34
of changes in population size and dependency ratios. More specifically, the age compo-
sition of a given country’s labour force appears to affect total factor productivity (TFP) 
and its growth, which are generally observed to be the most important sources of varia-
tion in economic performance in the empirical growth literature. The effect thus as-
sumes the features of a phenomenon of (transitory) endogenous growth. 
  Because of the nature of the multi-country, macro-level evidence brought forth here, 
one can of course only speculate about the precise nature of the economic mechanisms 
which drive these results. An interesting aspect is that the age-related profile of contri-
butions to TFP implies that workers in the age group 40–49 are most important for at-
taining high levels and faster growth of productivity, while the contributions of younger 
and older workers are considerably smaller. In other words, the particular age profile 
reflected in Mincerian wage regressions, which is usually taken to reflect productivity 
differentials related to age or experience, could feed through to TFP through external-
ities in the invention or, probably even more so, in the adoption and utilization of new 
technologies. This effect is indeed much stronger than anything that can be observed at 
the micro level. Closer scrutiny reveals that cohort effects in educational attainments 
may contribute, to some extent, to shaping this particular age-related pattern. But basi-
cally, it does not appear to be driven by the age structure of human capital. 
  There are a number of other plausible stories which could help explaining this pat-
tern and, hence, might deserve further examination in order to fully understand the re-
sults derived here. Essentially, though, they would have to be investigated in a different 
framework and, more importantly, at another level. For example, the aggregate-level 
findings in this study could reflect effects of the age composition of work teams which 
originate at the firm level. The specific education–experience mix, or simply the way in 
which members of different age groups interact with each other in such teams, could 
easily matter for their total productivity. There could be other factors, such as entrepre-
neurship, creativity or simply pragmatism, which give prime-aged individuals a particu-
lar weight in determining TFP and TFP growth through the creation of new inventions 
or their successful exploitation. Starting from intriguing measurement problems, it 
would certainly not be easy to conceptualize and really investigate these issues. Still, the 
results derived in this paper may effectively define a research agenda that ought to be 
tackled when further exploring the economic implications of demographic ageing. 
   35
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Appendix 
A.1 “Capital dilution” and endogenous saving 
As the original Ramsey (1928) model is based on infinitely-lived agents, it is not particularly suited for 
addressing questions of changes in the size of the labour force or the entire population. (An alternative 
interpretation by which the model reflects the behaviour of infinitely-lived “family dynasties” with per-
fect, descending altruism is also based on extreme, rather than standard, assumptions regarding the nature 
of intergenerational linkages.) Here, I will thus argue against the background of a simple two-period over-
lapping-generations (OLG) model with three generations (children, working-age population, retirees), in 
which the saving rate is determined endogenously through individuals who optimize their life-time con-
sumption profile. To keep things as simple as possible, labour supply and fertility of working-age indi-
viduals are taken to be exogenous (and child costs are included in the parents’ current consumption). The 
model is thus close to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 3, Appendix). 
a) Households 
In period t, total population Nt is assumed to consist of members of three generations, numbered by the 
period in which they become economically active: 
    1 1 + − + + = t t t t L L L N  (A.1) 
The number of those who are currently of working age is Lt, with Lt = (1+nt) Lt–1, etc. At the beginning of 
period t, working-age individuals choose their optimal life-time consumption plan by maximizing a utility 
function with a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. (Also, children are born at the beginning 
of t, so that parents can take into account changes in 1+nt+1 against 1+nt when making their decisions.) 
Their problem is given by 
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(A.2)
 
In equation (A.2), ct denotes current consumption and zt+1 consumption at old age. To nourish t+1-con-
sumption, individuals save a fraction st of their current wage earnings wt, from which they derive an inter-
est income of (1+rt+1)stwt in t+1; they leave no bequests. The elasticity of substitution between c and z is 
σ = 1/θ, governed by the parameter θ > 0; ρ ≥ 0 is a pure time-preference rate (and may be zero). 
  Substituting the budget constraints (i) and (ii) into (A.2), differentiating with respect to st and solving 
for the optimal saving rate yields 














s . (A.3) 
Here, st is a fraction of wages wt, not an aggregate-level saving rate. Yet, if total wage earnings, wtLt, are a 
constant share of aggregate output, a constant st translates into a constant aggregate saving rate. (With the 
Cobb–Douglas production function I am about to introduce, the aggregate saving rate is (1–α)st.) 
b) Firms 
Firms maximize profits and utilize a standard Cobb–Douglas technology, 
   
α
t t t k k f q = = ) ( , (A.4) 
qt being output per worker and kt the capital–labour ratio in period t.   38
  With competitive behaviour on all markets, factor prices are given by 
   
α α t t t t t k k k f k f w ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( − = ′ − = , (A.5) 
    δ α δ
α − = − ′ =
−1 ) ( t t t k k f r , (A.6) 
δ  being the rate of depreciation. 
c) Equilibrium 
For simplicity, I assume that δ = 1 over the length of t (as a non-critical assumption with respect to any of 
the results). The resource constraint of the economy then implies that 





















= . (A.7) 
Since st depends on 1+rt+1 (see equation A.3), hence on kt+1, the saving rate and the future capital–labour 
ratio are interdependent. Without any further assumptions, for example, regarding the shape of ut, it is 
therefore difficult to characterize the steady state and the transitional dynamics in this economy. (Note, 
for instance, that if θ = 1, so that the utility function behaves asymptotically as if it were logarithmic, the 
interdependence vanishes, and st is constant as in the Solow model.) Still, existence and uniqueness of the 
steady state can safely be taken as given for any variant captured by the current degree of specification. 
d) Behaviour of the saving rate 
Using (A.6) for t+1 and (A.7), equation (A.3) can be re-written as 
   











































Equation (A.3) is an optimality condition which must hold under whatever circumstances. I can therefore 
differentiate both sides with respect to 1+nt+1, defining  ) 1 ( / 1 + + ∂ ∂ = t t n n s s , and solve for sn. After a 
number of tedious computations and re-arrangements, I obtain 
    1 for 0 with ,
) 1 )( 1 ( 1 ) 1 (









































s . (A.9) 
It is easy to show that the denominator of the second term on the right-hand side of (A.9) is always posi-
tive because (1–θ )/θ is strictly larger than –1. Therefore, the sign of sn depends on the first term on the 
right-hand side, again (1–θ )/θ. This term is zero if θ = 1, implying that st is a constant and does not re-
spond to changes in 1+nt+1, as already noted earlier. It now becomes clear that this case separates two 
widely differing scenarios. 
 If  θ > 1 (i.e., if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is relatively low and the timing of con-
sumption really matters), individuals will save more in terms of a higher st if labour force growth is ex-
pected to decelerate in t+1. In other words, through higher savings they will reinforce the inverse capital 
dilution effect which, in its pure form, results from a constant saving rate. Conversely, if θ < 1 (i.e., if the 
elasticity of substitution is high and consumption smoothing is less important), individuals will save less, 
thereby weakening the capital dilution effect. All in all, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution turns 
out to be crucial for which effect of an increasing capital–labour ratio and the resulting downward pres-
sure on the rate of return will dominate the final outcome: consumption smoothing in the face of a fore-
seeable reduction in consumption possibilities at old age, or a substitution effect in favour of current con-
sumption because the latter is becoming less “expensive” in terms of future consumption forgone.   39
A.2 List of countries included in the sample 
OECD countries (27): Non-OECD  countries  (79): 
Australia Afghanistan  Guatemala  Papua  New  Guinea 
Austria Algeria Guinea-Bissau  Paraguay 
Belgium Argentina  Haiti  Peru 
Canada Bahrain    Honduras  Philippines 
Denmark Bangladesh  Hong  Kong  Rwanda 
Finland Barbados  India  Senegal 
France Benin  Indonesia  Sierra  Leone 
Germany Bolivia  Iran  Singapore 
Greece Botswana  Iraq  South  Africa 
Hungary Brazil  Israel  Sri  Lanka 
Iceland Burundi  Jamaica  Sudan 
Ireland Chile  Jordan Swaziland 
Italy China  Kenya  Syria 
Japan Cameroon  Kuwait  Tanzania 
Korea, Rep. of  Central African Rep.  Liberia  Thailand 
Mexico Colombia  Lesotho Togo 
Netherlands Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  Malawi Trinidad  &  Tobago 
New Zealand  Congo, Rep. of  Malaysia  Tunisia 
Norway Costa  Rica  Mali  Uganda 
Poland Cyprus Mauritania  United Arab Emirates 
Portugal Dominican  Rep.  Mauritius  Uruguay 
Spain Ecuador  Mozambique  Venezuela 
Sweden Egypt  Nicaragua  Yemen 
Switzerland El  Salvador Niger  Zambia 
Turkey Fiji  Nepal  Zimbabwe 
United Kingdom  Gambia  Pakistan   
United States  Ghana  Panama   
With data spanning the period from 1960 to 2000 at 5-year intervals, the maximum number of observa-
tions for each country is 9. The average number of observations which enter the level-estimates reported 
in Section 4.1 is 8.1 for the “all countries” sample, 8.6 for the OECD sample. In the growth-estimates that 
follow, differencing implies a reduction by one observation per country (while countries with just one 
observation drop out). Here the average number of observations is 7.4 and 7.6, respectively. For several 
reasons, sample size is further reduced in terms of countries and/or observations in the estimates reported 
in Section 4.2 and in the appendix. 
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A.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean  Std.  dev.  Min.  Max. 
Growth  accounting:     
   q (real GDP per worker, US-$)  17,214  16,786  487  196,173 
   κ (capital coefficient)  1.3623  0.8195  0.0892  6.2989 
   ln h (log measure of hum. cap.)  0.6056  0.3351  0.0141  1.3962 
   ln A (log TFP measure)  8.5801  0.7995  5.0615  12.4691 
Labour force by age groups:         
   L10–19 (share in total L)  0.1535 0.0699 0.0031 0.3063 
   L20–29 (share in total L)  0.2806 0.0370 0.1780 0.4380 
   L30–39 (share in total L)  0.2247 0.0343 0.1213 0.4046 
   L40–49 (share in total L)  0.1674 0.0350 0.1041 0.3010 
   L50–59 (share in total L)  0.1105 0.0296 0.0596 0.2243 
   L60plus (share in total L)  0.0633 0.0209 0.0039 0.1583 
Human capital by age groups:         
   h10–19 (relative to ln h)  1.2691 0.3692 0.1972 3.4578 
   h20–29 (relative to ln h)  1.2311 0.1870 0.6966 2.2302 
   h30–39 (relative to ln h)  0.9895 0.1969 0.3649 2.1448 
   h40–49 (relative to ln h)  0.8237 0.2256 0.0000 1.7753 
   h50–59 (relative to ln h)  0.7515 0.2646 0.0000 1.8850 
   h60plus (relative to ln h)  0.7416 0.3923 0.0000 2.7021 
       
Correlation Matrices 
  –ln A  –ln q  –ln κ  –ln h    
ln A  –1.0000       
ln q  –0.8376  –1.0000        
ln κ  –0.0336  –0.5339  –1.0000      
ln h  –0.3804  –0.7727  –0.6296  –1.0000    
  –ln A  –L1019  –L2029  –L3039  –L4049  –L5059 
ln A  –1.0000       
L1019 –0.5381  –1.0000        
L2029  –0.0644  –0.0246  –1.0000      
L3039  –0.4073 –0.7427 –0.1118  –1.0000    
L4049  –0.4193 –0.8091 –0.4695 –0.5744  –1.0000  
L5059  –0.3228 –0.6403 –0.5953 –0.1408  –0.7332  –1.0000 
L60plus –0.1405  –0.0950 –0.3970 –0.5220 –0.1243 –0.3195 
  –ln h  –h1019  –h2029  –h3039  –h4049  –h5059 
ln h  –1.0000       
h1019 –0.5920  –1.0000        
h2029 –0.3288  –0.5438  –1.0000      
h3030  –0.3359 –0.5816 –0.1993  –1.0000    
h4049  –0.5076 –0.6442 –0.6200 –0.4562  –1.0000  
5059  –0.4363 –0.4899 –0.8128 –0.1815 –0.6679  –1.0000 
h60plus  –0.2625 –0.2857 –0.6246 –0.3363 –0.2016  –0.7360 
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A.4 The age composition of the labour force and TFP:  
estimates for “non-oil” samples 
  (c)                             (d)           M 4           (e)                              (f) 
Sample Non-oil  90%
 a) Non-oil  80%
 a) Non-oil  75%
 a) Non-oil  66,7%
 a) 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
  b) Robust  OLS
  b) Robust  OLS
  b) Robust  OLS
  b) 










































Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –Yes – Yes  –Yes  –Yes 








Observations  –745  –602  –505  –405 
Countries  ––90  ––73  ––62  ––49 
R²  –88.9%  –89.0%  –87.8%  –88.2% 
a) “Non-oil  X%” means that countries are excluded if, in the 1960–2000 period, the share of fuel exports 
in total merchandise exports was more than once at or above the X
th percentile of the annual global dis-
tribution of these shares. Countries for which data on foreign trade are lacking are also omitted. 
b)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
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A.5 The age composition of the labour force, TFP and TFP growth: 
estimates for the samples with detailed human-capital data 
  (g)          M 4          (h)  (c)          M 7          (d) 
Sample All  countries
 a) OECD
 a) All  countries
 a) OECD
 a) 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
  b) Robust  OLS
  b) Robust  OLS
  b) Robust  OLS
  b) 
Dep. variable:  ln A ln  A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A 
























(∆) L40–49 (ref. group)      
















Year dummies  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes  –Yes 
Country dummies  –Yes – Yes  –No  –No 





Observations  –815  –217  –701  –185 
Countries  –103  ––27  –100  ––26 
R²  –87.8%  –87.6%  –7.4%  –34.9% 
a)  Samples restricted to observations for which data on the age composition of human capital as used in 
models M 11 and M 12 are available. 
b)  Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
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A.6 The age distribution of human capital, TFP and TFP growth: 
estimates without imputed figures for age-specific human capital 
  (a)               (b)               (c)            M 13 (d)          (e)                (f)               (g) 
Sample All  countries
 a) 
Estim. method  Pool. OLS  Robust OLS
 b) Pooled  OLS 












































































     
h20–29  –0.709 
–(1.815) 
  –0.156 
–(0.153) 
    
h30–39 –0.671 
–(2.385) 
  –0.132 
–(0.167) 
   
h40–49 –1.389 
–(2.040) 
   –0.153 
–(0.171) 
  
h50–59  –1.688 
–(1.335) 





     – 0 . 0 5 5  
–(0.184) 
Year dummies  –No – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – No – No 















Observations  ––86  –661  –660  –469  –276  ––91  ––91 
Countries  ––86  –100  –100  ––99  ––96  ––91  ––91 
R²  –63.8%  –88.9%  –88.8%  –92.8%  –96.3%  –60.1%  –60.1% 
a) Samples restricted to observations for which data on the age composition of human capital are avail-
able that have not been imputed based on Step 2 of the procedures explained in footnote 24. 
b) Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.)   44
A.6 (cont’d.) The age distribution of human capital, TFP and TFP growth: 
estimates without imputed figures for age-specific human capital 
  (a)                  (b)                 (c)     M 14     (d)                  (e)                  (f) 
Sample All  countries
 a) 
Estimation method  Robust OLS
 b) 
Dep. variable: ∆  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A  ∆ ln A 




































∆ L40–49 (ref. gr.)        






























   




  –0.338*** 
–(0.108) 
  




  –0.053 
–(0.134) 
 
∆ h40–49    –0.036 
–(0.209) 
   –0.124 
–(0.119) 
∆ h50–59        
∆ h60+        
Year dummies  –Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes – Yes 
Country dummies  –No – No  –No – No  –No  –No 
Observations  –360  –172  –556  –555  –368  –180 
Countries  ––96  ––87  –100  ––99  ––98  ––92 
R²  –14.6%  –30.2%  –8.5%  –10.4%  –13.5%  –28.0% 
a) Samples restricted to observations for which data on the age composition of human capital are avail-
able that have not been imputed based on Step 2 of the procedures explained in footnote 24. 
b) Residuals clustered by countries to avoid distortions of standard errors through serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at a 1-percent, 5-percent or 10-percent level, respectively. (Standard 
errors are in parentheses.) 
 